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SOME PROBLEMS WITH "ORIGINS"
Stephen A. Conrad*
I.
Back in 1984, when many in the academic community were
beginning to plan for the long Bicentennial Moment (1987-1991),
Stanley Katz published an essay entitled The Problem of a Colonial
Legal History. The essay appeared in a volume that collected assess-
ments, by leading experts, of the state of the art in a number of the
respective fields of scholarship that share "Colonial British America"
as their general topic.' In assessing the variety of current work in
the particular field of colonial American legal history, Katz's essay
sounded notes ranging from "lamentation" to "caution" to "grati-
fication", not to mention evident pride both in the recent growth of
the field and in examples of important "intellectual progress" within
it. But from first to last and overall, Katz's essay tended to dwell
on the circumstances that have continued 2 to make both the place
and the practice of writing on colonial American legal history prob-
lematic.
Especially to readers with an eye on the Bicentennial Moment,
Katz's essay gave, or should have given, pause. For just when so
many historians were gearing up for expeditious output of anniversary
scholarship on the Constitution of 1787 and the Bill of Rights, Katz
pointed out that, in America, "Constitutional history [as a profes-
sional scholarly discipline] is certainly not dead, but it is not flour-
ishing and its significance for colonial history is not altogether
obvious." 3 Even more troubling to me were Katz's observations about
the continuing influence on early American constitutional historiog-
* Professor of Law and Louis F. Niezer Faculty Fellow, School of Law, Indiana
University-Bloomington; J.D., 1982, Yale University; Ph.D., 1980 Harvard University.
1. Stanley N. Katz, The Problem of a Colonial Legal History, in COLONIAL BRITISH
AMERICA: ESSAYS IN THE NEw HISTORY OF THE EARLY MODERN ERA 457-89 (Jack P. Greene
& J.R. Pole eds., 1984).
2. Cf. Stanley N. Katz, Looking Backward: The Early History of American Law, 33 U.
Cm. L. REv. 867 (1966) (book review) (an early lament from Katz at the relative neglect of
the study of colonial American legal history).
3. Katz, supra note 1, at 463; See also Harry N. Scheiber, Introduction: the Bicentennial
and the Rediscovery of Constitutional History, in THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN LIFE 7-
14 (David Thelen ed., 1988).
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raphy of the traditional "origins"-and-"sources" method of English
legal historians:
[This] method not only focused on earlier periods of modern history,
but in the hands of its lesser practitioners it tended to be teleological
and Whiggish, two attributes that were accepted rather uncritically
by American practitioners of the art. The result was particularly
disastrous, and it is still with us - the tradition of discovering the
"origins" of everything, especially the Constitution of 1787 and the
American Bill of Rights.4
What, one might ask, could be so "disastrous" about trying to
"discover" the origins of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights?
Much of Katz's answer, in effect, was that this genealogical enterprise
of discovery has led to some "very crude assumptions about the
general character of the colonial legal system." 5 Moreover, these
assumptions have come to cohere in a predominant historical "model"
which takes as its premise that "the colonists must have had preformed
notions of appropriate legal behavior and that in order to understand
their behavior, it was [and is] the primary task of the legal historian
to understand the original pattern." '6 Historical scholarship written
on this premise has led to a widely endorsed interpretive conclusion
that:
The similarity of the colonial legal system to the [English] common
law, when placed in the context of British constitutionalism in the
seventeenth century, resulted in colonial dissatisfaction with British
authoritarianism both in 1689 and, more important, in the
Revolutionary era. The Americans of the late eighteenth century
were thus confronted with the apparent contradiction of a
commitment to common-law values and procedures and a rejection
of things British, which they solved by anti-British rhetoric and
common-law reality. 7
Katz himself did not propose to dispense entirely with this conclusion
or with the model that generates it.' But he did object that the model
4. Katz, supra note I, at 458 (emphasis added).
5. Id. at 476.
6. Id. at 477.
7. Id. at 476.
8. Id. ("It is, in fact,not a bad model, but it needs to be articulated more carefully than
hitherto has been done.") In effect, Katz tried to do something towards that end in Stanley
N. Katz, The American Constitution: A Revolutionary Interpretation, in BEYOND CONFEDER-
ATION: ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN NATIONAL IDENTITY 23-37 (Richard
Beeman et al. eds., 1987).
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has made for an "approach to the constitutional history of the early
republic [that] has focused so devastatingly on the intentions of the
framers and the late eighteenth-century governmental experience ...
[And this is] essentially a diversionary approach, distracting us from
concentrating upon the primary phenomena which we ought to be
studying." 9
Katz explained what he meant by such "primary phenomena"
by emphasizing that what he would most like to see - besides
continued progress in "demonstrating the interconnectedness of co-
lonial and national legal history" - is the development of a "sys-
tematic understanding of how law relates to society." By putting a
premium on this systematic understanding, we could better account
for "the cultural changes that transform the American understanding
of such concepts as authority and property."' 0
I don't presume to give here anything like a full restatement of
the nuanced historiographical commentary that Katz offered in his
1984 essay. But especially, I think, in the selected comments I have
quoted above, Katz's essay does afford a notably apt and authori-
tative point of departure for offering a few simple comments of my
own about some of the problems I see, now rather late in the
Bicentennial Moment, with the accrued historical literature on the
so-called "origins" of the Bill of Rights.
II.
Going into the Bicentennial Moment, the undislodged predomi-
nance of the old "origins"-and-"sources" approach to the Bill of
Rights was so pervasive that it shouldn't be too surprising that its
significance largely escaped notice, much less criticism. Perhaps noth-
ing is more emblematic of the predominance of this approach as
applied to the Bill of Rights than the "Table for Sources of the
Provisions of the Bill of Rights" that Edward Dumbauld included
in his 1957 book The Bill of Rights and What It Means Today."
And, as Dumbauld's "table" reflects, his approach to the origins of
the federal Bill of Rights forthrightly ignored the colonial period
9. Katz, supra note 1, at 477.
10. Id. at 484, 474; cf. Philip A. Hamburger, The Constitution's Accomodation of Social
Change, 88 MIcH. L. REV. 239 (1989) (especially at 245-258) (examining the intellectual context
of the views of the American framers and ratifiers on how constitutional change accomodates
social change).
11. Edward Dumbauld, State Precedents for the Bill Of Rights, 7 J. PuB. L. 323 (1958)
(especially at 343-44).
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altogether, and, indeed, looked back beyond 1776 only to advert
occasionally to the 1689 English Bill of Rights. The question is never
even raised in Dumbauld's book about the possible relevance of a
century and a half of colonial legal experience of attempting to
articulate and secure a variety of rights that was arguably greater
than (and almost inevitably different from) the scope of rights
discourse in England during the same period. In fact quite recently,
even so sophisticated a reader as Akhil Amar could justifiably remark
that, although Dumbauld's book "offers little in the way of consti-
tutional theory," it remains today "Itihe best modern account of the
Bill.''' 2
By contrast, in 1955 Robert Rutland had at least raised this
question that Dumbauld in 1957 either overlooked or set aside.
However, after effectively raising the question, Rutland then pro-
ceeded to give it very short shrift. In a book that in its title would
seem to have eschewed historical inquiry reaching back before 1776,
Rutland nevertheless affirmed the necessity of just such inquiry in
any comprehensive historical account of the Bill of Rights. He began
the preface of his The Birth of the Bill of Rights, 1776-1791 with so
forceful a testament to the rich complexity and diversity of the
colonial origins of the Bill of Rights that his opening paragraph
deserves to be quoted in full:
This book represents an effort to draw together in one volume the
story of how Americans came to rely on legal guarantees for their
personal freedom. The English common law, colonial charters,
legislative enactments, and a variety of events in the thirteen colonies
were the chief elements contributing to the rationale for a bill of
rights. Throughout the research and writing it was obvious that no
single man, no single occurrence, could be set apart for special
distinction. The facts show that the Federal Bill of Rights and the
antecedent state declarations of rights represented, more than anything
else, the sum total of American experience and experimentation
with civil liberty up to their adoption. It is worth noting that the
Salem witchcraft trials and the Federal Bill of Rights virtually
opened and closed the 18th century; and these historical incidents
indicate the tremendous American intellectual advancement during
that stirring span of time. 3
12. Akhil R. Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1132 n.3
(1991).
13. ROBERT A. RUTLAND, THE BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS, 1776-1791, at ix (1955)
(emphasis added) (See the 1991 Bicentennial Edition of this book, which I received after I
submitted the instant article to the publisher).
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Rutland thus affirms the need to attend carefully to eighteenth-
century colonial American legal culture, broadly construed, in ac-
counting for the American bills of rights of the Revolutionary and
Founding years. Yet immediately following this call not to neglect
the story of "the tremendous American intellectual advancement"
from the 1690's to the 1790's, Rutland moves to a chapter on "The
English Beginnings," and then to a chapter on the "Colonial Achieve-
ment" that breaks off with a word on the 1701 Pennsylvania Charter
of Liberties as not only the highwater mark of that achievement but
also more or less the last word that Rutland has to say on the
colonial period. In the next chapter he jumps ahead to the 1760's
and proceeds quickly to "Mr. [George] Mason's Proposal" of a
Virginia Declaration of Rights in the Revolutionary spring of 1776.
Still, if only unintentionally, Rutland did nicely call attention to
the problem of the virtual blackout in much general historical schol-
arship when it comes to American experience with the definition and
protection of "rights" between the imperial watershed of the Glorious
Revolution in England and the ultimate imperial crisis of 1765-1776
in America.' 4 And, if Dumbauld's book remains the "best" modern
account of the Bill of Rights, Rutland's may well remain the most
widely read: It was reissued in a slightly "revised edition" in 1983,
in both hard cover and paperback; and even the leading college
textbook on American history (which is edited by a preeminent
colonialist) has continued to refer students to Rutland's book alone
by way of a handy introduction to the origins of the Bill.'"
In the area of legal scholarship, however, I would hazard that
it is the various contributions of Bernard Schwartz on the origins of
the Bill of Rights that have been most frequently consulted and relied
on - and not only by Schwartz's fellow academics on law faculties
but by courts as well.' 6 In 1971 Schwartz published," and then in
14. Something of the same point is made by Jack P. Greene in From the Perspective of
Law: Context and Legitimacy in the Origins of the American Revolution, 85 S. ATLANTIC Q.
56, 74 (1986) (Greene takes to task Thomas C. Grey for Grey's misconception that "during
the colonial period Americans had not been much given to debate over issues of constitutional
theory."); cf. JACK P. GREENE, PERIPHERIES AND CENTER: CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN
THE EXTENDED POLITIES OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE AND THE UNITED STATES 1607-1788 (1986)
(wherein Greene documents the continual articulate concern of the colonists over problems of
legal and constitutional rights within the context of empire).
15. BERNARD BAILYN ET AL., THE GREAT REPUBLIC: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE
253 (3rd ed., 1985). A fourth edition is due out in the spring of 1992.
16. See William J. Brennan, Jr., Tribute to Professor Bernard Schwartz, 1988 N.Y.U.
ANN. SURV. AM. L. at ix (1988).
17. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (1971).
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1980 substantially republished," an important collection of docu-
ments-cum-commentary that was "presented," as he said, "from the
editor's point of view[, in order to] emphasize those aspects of the
development of the Bill of Rights which he considers of primary
significance.' 9 And Schwartz avowed that the history of "the Co-
lonial period" was one of those aspects. But, in fact, his attention
to colonial America before the onset of the Revolution is entirely
restricted to eleven colonial charters or analogous public documents,
leaving off in point of time - again - with the 1701 Pennsylvania
Charter of Liberties. Nothing at all that happened in America during
the six decades between the promulgation of that charter and the
Writs of Assistance controversy is deemed worthy of attention.
When in 1977 Schwartz produced his own one-volume synthetic
history of the Bill of Rights, it faithfully reflected his formalistic
"origins"-and-"sources" approach. After a first chapter on "English
Antecedents," the book turns to "Colonial Charters and Laws" in
a chapter that moves through the list of eleven to 1701, as in
Schwartz's earlier documentary collections, and then closes with a
three-page summary characterization of the "Colonial Pattern." There
Schwartz asks us to "recall that both the English Bill of Rights and
the colonial documents discussed did not really have the status of
constitutions, since they were subject to alteration or repeal at the
discretion of the legislature."20
I have no reason to dispute Schwartz's point as thus formulated.
But I can't help but think that this very point does not at all justify
Schwartz in going as far as he does to marginalize, indeed, largely
to ignore a great part of the indigenous colonial background of
American bills of rights. To me, his point hardly disposes of, rather,
it raises important questions about what we might agree to call the
"proto-constitutionalist" character of pre-Revolutionary rights dis-
course in eighteenth century America: If not significant as "consti-
tutional" claims, strictly speaking, what then was the suasive
18. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE ROOTS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1980).
19. Id. at xxiii.
20. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE GREAT RIGHTS OF MANKIND: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
BILL OF RIGHTS 52 (1977); cf. id. at 53 ("The American Revolution was the all-important link
between colonial liberties and the Federal Bill of Rights. Until Independence, there was no
legal authority to draw up constitutions and bills of rights ... .") (A 1992 Expanded Edition
of this book merely reprints the new edition, with an added "Afterword."). For yet another
recent example of the customary neglect of the history of American rights discourse between
the 1701 Pennsylvania Charter of Liberties and the Writs of Assistance controversy, see ROBERT
S. PECK, THE BILL OF RIGHTS & THE POLITICS OF INTERPRETATION 40-41 (1992).
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significance of the various rights claims that early and mid-eighteenth-
century Americans put forward on the basis of their colonial charters
and other signal public documents? Did the "rights" in question
represent claims that were somehow in some quarters considered
"constitutional," even if not in the sense that we mean today? Did
these "rights" in any way import "legal," as distinguished from
"constitutional," claims? Did they at times amount to quasi-legal
(e.g., equitable') or perhaps even extra-legal claims - or perhaps
something else entirely? These are questions that look not to a
collection of a few "great" documents that plot a progress of liberty,
but instead to the "historicity" of rights discourse2 - to the complex
meanings of rights claims in context. These are questions that look
to "ordinary," quotidian practice, including legal, political, and
social practice.
And they are questions not given sustained attention even in
some of the best historical writing that has of late tried to expand
somewhat beyond the genealogical, documentarian "origins"-and-
"sources" approach to the Bill of Rights. Often the best scholarship
does not do, or even try to do, as much as it acknowledges needs
to be done to give us a historically authentic account of the American
"origins" of American bills of rights. Witness how my fellow com-
mentator in this symposium Donald Lutz concludes his chapter on
"The Problem of Origins" in his 1988 book The Origins of American
Constitutionalism, with a passage that seems to balk at pursuing the
admittedly important task of explaining "origins" in terms of the
"dynamic" colonial culture of rights claims in actual "practice":
The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were a time of extraordinary
ferment in political thought and action among English-speaking
peoples. To say that political covenants and compacts from a biblical
model and that colonial charters contain the foundation elements
that appeared in American constitutions a century and a half later
is not a full-blown constitutional theory. The meanings of terms
change, the practices surrounding institutions will evolve, and
21. See, e.g., PETER C. HOFFER, THE LAW'S CONSCIENCE: EQUITABLE CONSTITUTIONALISM
IN AMERICA 47-79 (1990); see also Peter C. Hoffer, The Declaration of Independence as a Bill
in Equity, in THE LAw IN AMERICA, 1607-1861, at 186-209 (William Penack and Wythe W.
Holt, Jr. eds., 1989).
22. Cf. MAURICE W. CRANSTON, WHAT ARE Huiwi Riowrs 81 (1973) (1 owe this reference
to Prof. Lois G. Schwoerer, who endorses, as I mean to here, Professor Cranston's emphasis
on the importance of interpreting rights claims in their proximate historical context.).
19921
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completely new theories will develop to justify familiar practices.
Even so, a systematic examination of the political literature written
by Americans between 1760 and 1805 will illustrate the continued
connection with early colonial documents. 23
As Lutz himself takes care to point out, especially when it comes
to the question of what "generate[d] the core of [early American]
bills of rights," the "profound effect of the common law," as the
colonies had variously "wove[n] it into their respective political
traditions," is especially important. 24 Nevertheless, relying, he says,
largely on A. E. Dick Howard's 1968 book The Road From Run-
nymede'2 1 Lutz, in effect, subscribes to the old historigraphical prem-
ise that the best way to understand how the common law "evolved"
in America is in terms of Americans' "preformed notions" of the
original English pattern. 6 As enlightening as this approach is in some
respects, its incidental costs are great.
In important and influential books like those by Dumbauld,
Schwartz, Howard, and Lutz that I have mentioned, this approach
leads, for example, to the omission of any reference whatsoever to
the historic 1735 trial of the colonial publisher John Peter Zenger
for seditious libel against the royal governor of New York. Here was
a trial that, as one historian of the American Bill of Rights tells us,
"firmly established in the American colonies, in 1735, the rights of
juries that were not gained in England until 1792. It established, at
least in the minds of the people, that truth was a defense to libel." '27
23. DONALD S. LUTz, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 12 (1988).
24. Id. at 60, 59; see also FORREST McDONALD, Novus ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL
ORIGINs OF THE CONSTITUTION 12-14, 17-19, 22, 33-37 (1985).
25. A. E. DICK HOWARD, THE ROAD FROM RUNNYMEDE: MAGNA CARTA AND CONSTITU-
TIONALISM IN AMERICA (1968).
26. See supra text accompanying note 6.
27. IRvINo BRANT, THE BIL OF RIGHTS: ITS ORIN AND MEANING 179 (1965). cf. GILMAN
OSTRANDER, THE RIGHTS OF MAN IN AMERICA, 1606-1861, at 82 (1969). "The Zenger case
had no direct effect upon the law of the land, and not until the nineteenth century was truth
officially admitted in a court of law as favorable evidence in certain libel cases. Nor need the
judges in the Zenger case have allowed the decision of the jury to go unchallenged, had they
chosen to overrule it. But in a dramatic trial, the principle had been asserted successfully that
a newspaper ought to be free to criticize the government by presenting statements of fact.
Newspaper editors, on the eve of the Revolution, were able to feel reasonably secure in this
right, however vulnerable they might technically be in point of law." See Rutland's brief
treatment of the Zenger case in the 1991 Bicentennial edition of his general history of the Bill
of Rights cited supra note 13, at 22-23, 235. For the most historically informed appreciation
of the Zenger case, see the Editor's Introduction, JOHN ALEXANDER, A BRIEF NARRATIVE OF
THE CASE AND TRIAL OF JOHN PETEn ZENGER, PRINTER OF THE NEW YORK WEEKLY (Stanley
N. Katz ed., 1972) (especially at 1-2, 34-35).
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Thus, in my pleading here for more attention to the indigenous
colonial background of American bills of rights, I don't consider
that I am disregarding the premium that our patristic constitutional
culture manifestly places on the extraordinary, Revolutionary "found-
ing" period of the late eighteenth century. To the contrary, I'm
pleading that we take the founders even more seriously than some
of our best scholarship seems to, particularly when we hear the
founders themselves directing our attention back to some of the
colonial American "origins" of bills of rights. After all, no less a
founder than the brilliant and forceful Gouverneur Morris
"is said to have stated that instead of dating American liberty from
the Stamp Act [of 1765], he traced it to the persecution of Zenger;
because that event revealed the philosophy of freedom, both of
thought and speech, as an inborn human right, so nobly set forth
in Milton's speech for the "Liberty of Unlicensed Printing." 2
In the two passages I have just quoted from Irving Brant's 1965
book The Bill of Rights: Its Origin and Meaning, I have turned at
last to the work that the eminent constitutional historian Leonard
Levy called in 1984 "the best written and most comprehensive
survey" 29 of the Bill. Yet, even Brant's distinctive effort at compre-
hensiveness does not go as far as I would like in transcending some
of the problems that Stanley Katz has distinguished in the "origins"-
and-"sources" approach. For example, despite Brant's highlighting
of a celebrated American trial or two,30 he portrays colonial American
jurisprudence as overwhelmingly derivative of English legal and po-
litical norms. There is little attempt to understand how legal or
legalistic rights claims in colonial America were functionally related
to changes in American society at large. As Donald Lutz himself
emphasized in open discussion at our symposium, such an under-
standing of the function of rights claims would require us to look
beyond the respective internal discourses of law and politics to other
categories of human "behavior." Alas, the historiography of colonial
American law and constitutionalism is not yet generally very well
informed by such external perspectives.
28. BRANT, supra note 27, at 180 (quoting from a 1906 dissenting judicial opinion of a
Justice of the Supreme Court of Colorado).
29. Leonard W. Levy, Bill of Rights, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AmERIcAN POLITICAL HISTORY
125 (Jack P. Greene ed., 1984).
30. Cf. BRANT, supra note 27, at 193-95 (discussing not only the Zenger case, but also the
1770 New York trial of Alexander MacDougall for seditious libel).
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III.
Lest my concern with the indigenous early American law-in-
practice, common-law background of American constitutionalism
seem merely antiquarian and academic, I pause to invoke repeated
statements of concern in the same vein from the bench. Ellen Peters,
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the State of Connecticut, has
lately called for both a reinvigoration of common-law approaches to
state constitutional law in general," and, more particularly, a better
informed understanding of the "common law antecedents of consti-
tutional law" in her home state. Indeed, she professes "confiden[ce]
that ... traditional learning in the common law will enable us to
meet the [current] challenge [of] assigning independent meaning to
independent state constitutions.' '32 Now that we are entering into a
contemplated 'constitutional revolution' in the judicial interpreta-
tion of individual rights provisions of state constitutions," '33 it would
seem that a historically informed understanding of the common-law
background of our various state constitutions and their traditions is
potentially more important than ever before, and not least with
respect to controversies that turn on provisions of the several bills
of rights.
In significant ways, however, the problem of our inadequate
understanding of the colonial element in this background goes beyond
the chronic basic problem of "the paucity of historical writing on
law in the colonial period. 3 4 For example, I think the recent remark
of historian Jack Rakove is quite correct: that "[t]he most important
work35 [we yet have] on pre-Revolutionary conceptions of rights" is
John Phillip Reid's volume The Authority of Rights, in Reid's series
on the "Constitutional History of the American Revolution.' '36 In
fact, with that volume and others in his other series,37 Reid has
31. Ellen A. Peters, State Constitutional Law: Federalism in the Common Law Tradition,
84 MICH. L. REV. 583 (1986).
32. Id. at 593; cf. Ellen A. Peters, Common Law Antecedents of Constitutional Law in
Connecticut, 53 ALE. L. REv. 259 (1989).
33. Robert F. Williams, State Constitutional Law: Teaching and Scholarship, 42 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 244 (1991).
34. Frank A. Cassell, Book Review, 48 WM. & MARY Q. 129 (1991).
35. Jack N. Rakove, The Madisonian Theory of Rights, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 245,
248 n.5 (1990).
36. JOHN P. REI, CONSTITUIONAL HISTORY OF Tm AMRICAN REVOLUTION: Tm Au-
THORITY OF RIOHTS (1986).
37. See e.g., JOHN P. REID, Tm CONCEPT OF LIBERTY IN THE AOE OF Tm AMERICAN
REVOLUTION (1988); JOHN P. REID, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION IN THE AGE OF TiE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1989).
[Vol. 16
Problems with "Origins"
rather come to dominate the current marketplace of ideas on this
crucial question of what rights talk really meant to the latter-day
colonists. And, alas, in some ways his influence perpetuates and even
exacerbates some of the old "problems" that bedevil our accounts
of the origins of our bills of rights and that render those accounts
less useful than they might be as part of our usable past.
No doubt, one of the chief benefits of Reid's rapidly amassing
scholarship is that, if only by dint of his obvious erudition, he puts
the burden on us to "take seriously" 38 the colonists' rights talk as
something more than a mere function of their peculiarly "ideologi-
cal" politics. 9 Moreover, he presses us, as readers have not been
much pressed for decades, 40 to take that rights talk seriously as talk
about law. Thus, among current historians of colonial and Revolun-
tionary America, Reid is the legalist par excellence. But, one might
argue - as more than one reviewer has sharply argued - that in
taking the lead in rehabilitating the importance of a legalistic per-
spective on the development of eighteenth-century American consti-
tutionalism, 4' Reid is propounding an exceedingly limited conception
of "law." And it is a conception almost hermetically sealed, at that.
In Reid's important volume purporting to explain to us "the
authority of rights" in the hearts and minds of late-eighteenth-century
Americans, and in his other most closely related books, he expressly
reduces the meaning of "law" in America completely to the "taught
tradition" of Coke, that is, the received "ideology" of the seven-
teenth-century English common law. Accordingly, in Reid's view,
investigation of the "jurisprudential history" of eighteenth-century
America should "concentrate on concepts, ideas, and even semantic
usage .... [by forthrightly addressing 1law as an abstraction." In-
deed, in his attempts to represent the authentic significance of legal
and legalistic concepts, Reid insists not just that a concept like
"rights" should be studied exclusively as a matter of "intellectual
history," without reference to contemporary social and economic
circumstances, but that the "manifest reality" of such a concept in
its day was that it stood "in isolation. . . from social and economic
38. See Eben Moglen, Book Review, 9 LAw AND HIST. REv. 389, 390, 397 (1991).
39. Cf. BERNARD BAIIYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIOINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 31
(1986) (on the role of law in the origins of the Revolution) (Pulitzer-Prize winning book).
40. See Barbara A. Black, The Constitution of Empire: The Case for the Colonists, 124
U. PA. L. REv. 1157, 1158 nn.3-8 (1976).
41. See, e.g., Jack P. Greene, From the Perspective of Law: Context and Legitimacy in
the Origins of the American Revolution, S. ATLANTIC Q. 56 (1986).
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considerations" - and in isolation from every other category of
extra-legal thought, even, nay, especially, political thought. 42 As the
reviewer Sandra VanBurkleo has put it, "For Reid, eighteenth-century
common law ideology is a well-ordered intellectual shell. ' 4 Reid,
then, would seem to be attempting to turn the study of eighteenth-
century American constitutional history away from the pursuit of a
"systematic understanding of how law relates to society." It is not
merely that, for Reid, the "context" of rights talk as law talk is
secondary; context simply does not exist."
What Reid has accomplished by means of his resolute disregard
of context is very important: he has succeeded more than anyone
before him in reconstructing, as it were, the authentically righteous,
indeed, self-righteous, voice of eighteenth-century whig legalism. 45
And, in accomplishing this feat of reconstruction, he scrupulously
disclaims any pretense to be giving us a study of constitutional theory
in general. But the focus and emphasis of his work have undeniable
implications for how we are to understand early American constitu-
tional theory.
For example, in elaborately restoring the web of meanings and
connotations of the whig "dogma" that defined "liberty," "the rule
of law," and "constitutionalism" itself in terms of property"4 - and
thus in arguing that an essentially propertarian general conception
of rights in America was legally entailed by English common law -
Reid distracts attention from, if he does not foreclose, questions
about both the development and the effects of this historic concep-
tualization of the idea of rights as a derivative of the idea of property.
For Reid contends that the English common-law tradition determined
that Americans would, and had to, conceive of rights as property
and, in fact, largely as incidents of property. That point is likely to
ring true to anyone who has read the records of the Federal Con-
vention of 1787, where delegate after delegate, except for James
Wilson, spoke up to endorse a putative social consensus that the
chief purpose of government is the protection of property and, more
to the point, the protection of the rights of property. 47 But this "ring
42. REm, THE CONCEPT OF LIBERTY, supra note 37, at 1-3.
43. Sandra F. Van Burkleo, Book Review, 33 Am. J. OF LEGAL HIST. 378, 385 (1989),
44. See, e.g., Moglen, supra note 38, at 396.
45. See Stephen A. Conrad, The Constitutionalism of "the Common-law Mind,"13 LAW
& SOCIAL INQUIRY 619 (1988); Stephen Conrad, Book Review, 45 WM. & MARY Q. 775 (1988).
46. See REID, THE AUTHORITY OF RIGHTS, supra note 36, passim.
47. See, e.g., I THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 605 (Max Farrand
ed., 1937).
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of truth" as to the testimony of the Framers hardly amounts to
comprehensive "constitutional history" (as Reid acknowledges); nor
does it afford sufficient grounds for accepting Reid's determinism,
or for resting content with his disregard of context and effects.
Still, amid the predominating, albeit understandable, neo-whig
revivalism of the Bicentennial Moment, a late entry into the scholarly
literature of the moment like Jennifer Nedelsky's 1990 book Private
Property and the Limits of American Constitutionalism can seem,
alas, somehow deviant, if not downright un-Anglo-American. She
says, for example, in the introduction of her book, that:
treating the protection of unequal property as the paradigm case of
protecting individual rights in a democracy led [at the Founding]
to a misconception of the complex relation between democracy and
individual autonomy, which is the true problem of
constitutionalism .... The Framers' preoccupation with property
generated a shallow conception of democracy and a system of
institutions that allocates political power unequally and fails to
foster political participation."
Nedelsky then proceeds to give us a bracing and subtle book that
moves us past the old business of simply authenticating the distinc-
tively propertarian character of the libertarianism of the Ango-
American rights tradition. She faces up to the problems of that
articulate propertarian reduction of the concepts of rights and liberty
at the Founding and afterwards. More obviously politically engaged,
but perhaps at bottom really no more so engaged, than the many
neo-whig historians I have named thus far, Nedelsky gives us critical
history that is intellectually and jurisprudentially important in great
part because it insists on our taking into account an expanded range
of historical experience, both in terms of chronology and in terms
of society.
But even with her welcome expansion of scope, which sustains
a revisionist interpretation of the Founding and its legacy in relation
to one another, what Nedelsky's enrichment of the "origins"-and-
"sources" approach fails to bring into view is both the contingency
and the ambiguity of the national ("Madisonian") rights tradition
48. JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTION-
ALLSM: THE MADISONiAN FRAmEWORK AND ITS LEGACY 3, 1 (1990). For a rather different
perspective, see JAMES W. ELY, JR., TH GuARDL OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS (1992).
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she critiques. In fact, I believe that no historian concerned with these
matters of contingency and ambiguity thinks that we yet know as
much as we should or could in these respects. It seems that much
of the hard work remains yet to be done in uncovering and explaining
the historical data that could give us an appreciation of how the
varieties of rights talk actually developed in the ways they did so as
to be codified in bills of rights in the last quarter of the eighteenth
century. But there is already some exemplary work in print that
contributes towards this end. Perhaps our best general historical
studies of the "origins" of our bills of rights will begin incorporating
the lessons of this work.
A good example of the sort of exemplary work I have in mind
is the ongoing research of John Murrin and A. G. Roeber on that
historically talismanic common-law right that became a part of the
federal Bill of Rights in more ways than one: trial by jury. In a
recent, co-authored article entitled "Trial by Jury: The Virginia
Paradox," 9 Murrin and Roeber examine the ordinary-law back-
ground of this "right" in Virginia, as disclosed in legislation and
court practice, across the span of the entire colonial period. And,
very much, I think, in accord with the leading "interpretive
frameworks'" 0 in early American historiography today, they trace a
distinctively indigenous American legal history that sheds new light
on discontinuities over time, and among colonies and regions, when
it comes to the true "origins" of the constitutional "tradition"
invoked during the Revolution and the Founding. As Murrin and
Roeber put it, the salient "facts" in the "origins"-and-"sources"
historiography "suggest a passionate commitment to juries among
educated Virginians during the American Revolution. If we look
further back than the 1760s, however, the picture is less clear."'
As to the remarkable variety in the access to juries and how
they were actually used in the several colonies, Murrin and Roeber
note a key factor that has usually been overlooked: "We can explain
this astonishing variety only by realizing that the early settlers inher-
ited a thoroughly ambiguous tradition from the mother country. '5 2
Moreover, with that factor squarely recognized, the way is open to
understand better the strikingly fitful development of the rights to,
49. John M. Murrin and A. G. Roeber, Trial by Jury: The Virginia Paradox, in THE BILL
OF RIGHTS: A LIVELY HERITAGE 109 (John Kukla ed., 1987).
50. See Jack P. Greene, Interpretive Frameworks: The Quest for Intellectual Order in Early
American History, 48 Wm. & MARY Q. 515 (1991).
51. Murrin and Roeber, supra note 49, at 109-10.
52. Id. at 112.
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and the rights of, juries in colonial Virginia. Assiduous reading of
court records and careful attention to the vagaries of colonial legis-
lation promulgated from Williamsburg reveal that:
White Virginians welcomed juries in three stages. Jury trials for
capital offenses were secure by the 1630s. Civil juries had a more
checkered history. Seldom used until the 1640s, they were at least
available thereafter. By the late seventeenth century, a typical county
had witnessed a few civil trials by jury each year, but the justices
dispatched the bulk of civil business .... After a halting growth in
the late seventeenth century, the criminal jury virtually disappeared
in the first half of the eighteenth century ... and won a significant
place for itself only after 1750 .... 3
Most surprising, perhaps, at least in light of the propertarian rhetoric
of liberty during the Revolution and the Founding, Virginians far
into the eighteenth century "got along well month after month, year
after year, without using petit juries [even in debt-collection cases] ...
Virginians trusted the wisdom of the gentlemen justices of the county
court."
5 4
After a lowering of property qualifications for jurors that was
enacted in 1748, there was a noticeable change in this pattern, and
in public discourse; and "in the decade before 1776, as a whole,
juries more often became a political issue when property, not life or
liberty, was at stake."" Thus, when the right to trial by jury is
examined in terms of institutional practice and against the contem-
porary social and economic background, the synchronic common-
law ideology of ancient and immemorial rights loses much of its
force in explaining the "origins" of two of the provisions in our Bill
of Rights:
Because articles 8 and 11 of the Virginia Declaration of Rights were
the antecedents of articles 6 and 7 of the Bill of Rights, they must
be understood in the local context of Virginia's legal history. One
need not look for stirring and sensational issues to explain why
eighteenth-century farmers and merchants were sensitive about an
institution that only recently they had begun using frequently. 6
In Murrin and Roeber's article, which is but a sample of the results
of their arduous researches, there is, then, compelling evidence that
53. Id. at 113.
54. Id. at 122.
55. Id. at 124, 127.
56. Id. at 128.
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early American constitutionalism developed quite differently from
the rather linear, if sometimes interrupted, progress that is limned
by the still prevailing "origins"-and-"sources" account of the Bill
of Rights. In the story Murrin and Roeber tell, there is a sense of
contingency - a sense of political, and social, and economic choices
continually being made as matters of policy - that lay behind the
whig tradition of common-law constitutionalism. In fact, Murrin and
Roeber go further, by giving us a sense of a volitional early American
constitutionalism that was a function not only of contingencies but
also of the inherent ambiguity altogether authentic to the tradition.
This now increasingly perceived feature of early American con-
stitutionalism - its chronic ambiguity -is most pointedly and per-
suasively emphasized, I believe, in the writings of Murrin's and
Roeber's fellow historian of colonial America David Konig. 7 Like
Murrin and Roeber, Konig has investigated in great detail surviving
records of ordinary legal practice in colonial Virginia. And what he
has learned and shared from his investigation provides an invaluable
supplement and complement to some of our best informed accounts
of what we thought we "knew" about the "origins" of the Bill of
Rights.
For example, my fellow participant in this symposium Robert
Palmer has given us what may be the best study we have to date in
support of the important point that, during the great debate on a
federal bill of rights during the Ratification period, "[tihe concern
for individual rights in the debate was not concern for rights as
such, not a concern for individuals and individualism, but for rights
vis-a-vis [sic] the federal government. '"58 That is a proposition the
importance of which I would be loath to challenge as part of the
explanation of the proximate "origins" of the federal Bill of Rights.
Nevertheless, I am also persuaded by Konig that, when it comes
to understanding the origins of the Bill of Rights in terms of
arrangements between respective territorial spheres, of politics and
of jurisdiction, there is more to the story than is captured in Palmer's
proposition. For example, in a recently published essay, Konig returns
to the phenomenon of so many "uncertainties and turnabouts" in
57. My own predisposition to such an emphasis on ambiguity is confessed at length in
Stephen A. Conrad, Metaphor and Imagination in James Wilson's Theory of Federal Union,
13 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY I passim (1988) (especially at 4).
58. Robert C. Palmer, Liberties as Constitutional Provisions, in LIBERTY AND COMMUNITY:
CONSTITUTION AND RIGHTS IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC 115 (1987).
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the very same Ratification debates on which Palmer focuses. Yet
Konig finds that these debates
reflect more than a simple disagreement over state's rights. State's
rights certainly were one manifestation of the debate, but at bottom
these uncertainties and reversals reflected, simultaneously, a consensus
on rights but an imperfectly worked out notion of how best to
establish them through practical provisions. That assertion will not
surprise many historians, but it is a proposition that requires us to
break new ground in understanding exactly what institutional
arrangements Virginians had come to rely upon for protecting their
rights in the eighteenth century. 9
The piece of ground that Konig breaks in his essay has to do
with the complexity of the relationship in practice between two
fundamental values in the common-law tradition: on the one hand,
the securing of "due process"; and on the other hand, the authority
of local custom:
Throughout the Richmond debates [on Ratification] a single thread
is woven - a recurring theme in general, with a recurring specific
concern. The concern is the reliance on local institutions to preserve
a larger conception of rights. These were not state's rights, but the
right to a body of justice that protects the liberty and property of
the community .... But [at the same time there was concern that
this right] might require reinforcement through the operation of a
"constitution paramount to government." [citation omitted] In
colonial Virginia, this had taken the form of a balance between the
locality and provincial institutions that could not be easily reduced
to iron rules or express wording.60
In the context of long-standing concern in colonial Virginia over this
problem of how to balance, or provide for mutual reinforcement of,
these two competing fundamental values, the Ratification debate in
Virginia comes to look like "a debate writ large from struggles going
on in Virginia to preserve local [county] justice even from interference
by other parts of Virginia." 6' Indeed, on the evidence that Konig
adduces, 62 his point seems indispensable as a part of any comprehen-
59. David T. Konig, Natural Rights, Bills of Rights, and the People's Rights in Virginia
Constitutional Discourse, 1787-1791, in THE SOUTH'S ROLE IN THE CREATION OF THE BILL OF
RIGHTS 36 (Robert J. Haws ed., 1991).
60. Id. at 43-44.
61. Id. at 45.
62. See, e.g., David T. Konig, Country Justice: The Rural Roots of Constitutionalism in
Prerevolutionary Virginia, in AN UNCERTAIN TRADITION: CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE HISTORY
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sive understanding of the Virginia origins of the Bill of Rights. And
a very important part of the larger, national story of "origins" those
Virginia origins are. Now it appears that they cannot be really
understood at all except with the added new light that the work of
colonial legal historians is casting on them.
IV.
The exemplary work of colonial legal historians like Murrin,
Roeber, and Konig is by no means restricted to the endeavors of a
small band crying in the woods. In fact, the significance of the work
of each of those three, and others like them, has been widely
recognized among the most discerning scholars and students of
colonial American history in general for a long time now. But, if
only because I myself have been slow to explore such work, and to
begin to catch on to its importance, I am sensitive to the problem
that it is imprudently neglected by all too many of us, in law schools
and elsewhere in the academy, who try to understand and explain
the "origins" of the uniquely American constitutionalism that we
have been celebrating during the Bicentennial Moment. Presumptu-
ously, to be sure - since I am no scholar, but only a beginning
student, of colonial legal history; and since I have in large part but
repeated here a message that others like Stanley Katz have conveyed
before and better - I offer the foregoing remarks, respectfully, as
a word to the wise.
OF THE SouTH 63 (Kermit L. Hall & James W. Ely, Jr., eds., 1989); David T. Konig,
Colonization and the Common Law in Ireland and Virginia, 1569-1634, in THE TRANSFORMATION
OF EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY: SocIETY, AUTHORrrY, AND IDEOLOGY 70-92, 276-280 (James A.
Henretta et al. eds., 1991).
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